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DeFUIIIS IS MOOT
The Supreme Court by 5/4 vote on April 23, 1974 held
DeFunis moot. Since, Marco DeFunis would,
graduate from the University of Washington School of
Law. And it remains unclear whether law school
admissions must be racially neutral or whether for
certain objectives, e.g., to bring about greater diversity
in classes and in the profession, they may be racially
conscious.
Only Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, spoke to the
merits in DeFunis. He found that racial neutrality in
admissions is required by the Equal Protection
Clause. It was not clear to Mr. Justice Douglas, from
the record, whether DeFunis was discriminated
against because of his race. Thus, said Douglas, the
case should be remanded for a new trial to determine
whether the law school's selection was racially neutral.
Among the new trial issues, he said, should be the
question whether the LSAT can appropriately be used
for minorities. As possible alternatives, he suggested a
substitute test (which would probe openly into an
applicant's cultural background and relation to
groups). He recommended the use of interviews,
summer programs, consideration of prior achieve-
ments in light of racial discriminations that may have
barred the way, and the likelihood that a particular
candidate will employ his or her legal skills to service
communities now inadequately represented. "Con-
ceivably," he said, "an admissions committee might
conclude that a selection by lot of say the last 20 seats
is the only fair solution."
Since only one member of the Court has spoken to
the merits, positions taken in the briefs retain vitality
as sources for deliberation. The Editor.
TWO OUTSTkINDING BRIEf
MUST THE CONSTITUTIC
When the applicants for admission to an entering
class greatly outnumber the available places, the
admissions officers must ask not only (1) does the
applicant have the qualifications necessary for
admission if space is available, but also (2) if
qualified, should he or she be selected in preference to
the other qualified candidates who must be rejected.
The first question can usually be answered by
reference to more-or-less objective measures of
scholastic promise and accomplishment. The same or
different or partially-overlapping criteria may be set
up for the process of selection.
The choice of criteria for selection depends upon
educational judgments concerning the quality of
education the institution wishes to offer. A given
(Please turn to page 18)
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TIE ISSUE IS NOT
I THE CRITICILQUESTION:
,l JRYS BE COLOR BLIND?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Marco DeFunis was not permitted to compete for all
of the places in the entering class of the University of
Washington Law School. He was excluded solely
because of his race from a significant number of
places which were set aside and reserved for other
races. Had DeFunis been black, Indian, Chicano or
Philippine, such exclusion would have been uncon-
stitutional. (Indeed if DeFunis were any of these, most
of those appearing against him here would be his
champions instead of his adversaries.) If the
Constitution prohibits exclusion of blacks and other
minorities on racial grounds, it cannot permit the
exclusion of whites on racial grounds. For it must be
the exclusion on racial grounds which offends the
Constitution, and not the particular skin color of the
person excluded.
For at least a generation the lesson of the great
decisions of this Courtand the lesson of contemporary
history have been the same: discrimination on the
basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional,
inherently wrong and destructive of democratic
society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told
that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but
only a matter of whose ox is gored. Those for whom
racial equality was demanded are now to be more
equal than others. Having found support in the
Constitution for equality, they now claim support for
inequality under the same Constitution. This is the
classic hard case making very bad law.
A state-imposed racial quota is a per se violation of
the Equal Protection Clause because it utilizes a
factor for measurement that is necessarily irrelevant
to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose.
A racial quota is a device for establishing a status, a
caste, determining superiority or inferiority for a class
measured by race without regard to individual merit.
There was a finding by both courts below that the
State of Washington used racial criteria to exclude
DeFunis from admission to the State's law school.
Exclusion from a state law school on the basis of race
has long since been declared by this Court to be
unconstitutional.
The only justification for use by a state of a racial
classification is its use to cure or alleviate specific,
(Please turn to page 19)
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institution might wish simply to select students at the
highest intellectual capacity, measured by scholastic
records and potential. Another institution might wish
to give substantial weight to superior intellectual
qualifications in filling all the places in the class-say
40 percent weight-but conclude that an equally
marked superiority in other important qualities
should be enough to offset them. At Harvard College
experience has convinced admission authorities that if
promise of high scholarship were the sole or even
predominant criterion, Harvard College would lose a
great deal of its vitality and the quality of the
educational experience offered to all students would
suffer.
The Equal Protection Clause does not impose an
iron rule of "color-blindness." Prior opinions of this
Court recognize that assigning minority students to a
particular school in the same proportion to its student
body as the minority bears to the whole population
"as an educational policy" is "within the broad
discretionary powers of school authorities" (Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board ofEducation, 402 U.S.
1, 16 (1971)). The Equal Protection Clause looks to
equal treatment of the members of the identifiable
groups composing society, not to disregard of the
special characteristics of their members. An
admissions policy that purposefully excludes members
of a disadvantaged minority, segregates them or limits
their number, asserts their inferiority to the
predominant groups and therefore constitutes
"hostile" or "invidious," and unconstitutional
discrimination. An admissions policy that includes
members of disadvantaged minorities in order to
improve the education offered all students, carries no
"hostile" or "invidious" implication. When an
inclusive policy is conscientiously followed, race or
color is a helpful but not invariably reliable indicator
of special social, economic or cultural background
and experience likely to carry their own varieties of
talent, outlook and interests. The fact that race or
color is only one of many highly personal
characteristics used as a basis for judgment in
preferring some qualified applicants over others in the
inescapable process of selection helps to minimize any
danger that such attention will be or be seen as
"invidious."
Because giving attention to disadvantaged minority
status in including minorities as a means of obtaining
the diversity which raises the quality of education is
not "hostile" or "invidious," it can be justified
without "compelling purposes." Obviously, the
distinctions thus drawn are not arbitrary or
capricious. The objective of improving education for
all students is permissible and non-discriminatory.
The means is reasonably adapted to the objective.
Should it be held that any notice of race requires a
"compelling" justification, then we submit that
seriously seeking to improve the non-discriminatory
educational opportunities afforded all students is such
a purpose.
II.
Definition of community needs and choice of
emphasis in filling them is a central aspect of
educational policy-making at any institution of higher
learning. An institution's choice of the criteria to use
in the selection of an entering class from a larger
number of qualified applicants will be deeply
influenced by its choice of ultimate objectives. In
recent years many institutions of higher education
have determined that their objectives should include
removing the special obstacles facing disadvantaged
minority groups in access to higher education,
business and professional opportunities, and profes-
sional services-obstacles which are deeply ingrained
consequences of the hostile public and private
discrimination pervading the social structure. Giving
favorable weight to minority status in selecting
qualified students for admission is an important
method of reducing these disadvantages.
Neither the pursuit of this objective nor the means
adopted is beyond the scope of educational policy-
making discretion under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit all
racially-conscious government activity, but only that
which is "hostile" or "invidious" towards minorities
without compelling justification; or which occurs in
relation to a "fundamental right" without compelling
justification; or which falls under the general
constitutional ban against arbitrary or capricious
classification. Giving an advantage in law school
admissions in order to reduce the disadvantages
suffered by members of minority groups long subject
to pervasive discrimination, is neither "hostile" nor
"invidious." Legal education is not a "fundamental
right." Nor is counting membership in a disadvan-
taged minority arbitrary or capricious. Offsetting the
disadvantages is a permissible object of state policy.
Giving favorable weight to membership in a
disadvantaged minority in the process of admissions is
so plainly related to reducing the disadvantages which
blacks, chicanos, American Indians and other
minorities suffer in access to higher education and
career opportunities and in securing legal services as
(Please turn to page 20)
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illegal racial discrimination. There is no basis in this
record even to suggest earlier illegal racial
discrimination to be remedied by the racial quota
adopted by the law school here.
Even if a racial quota were not, per se, a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause, like any racial
classification it was not available for use by a state in
the absence of a "compelling state interest." There is
no "compelling state interest" shown on this record.
ARGUMENT
The Racial Quota Utilized by the Law School of the
University of the State of Washington Is a Violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The facts have been set out in detail in the above
Statement in order to reveal the true nature of the
racial quota system for admissions adopted by the
University of Washington Law School. The size of the
class was fixed within approximately five places.
There was no suggestion that class size was
expandable. (St. 115; 333-34.) Minority and majority
applicants, as those terms were defined by the law
school, went through separate, segregated admission
procedures. (St. 351; 359; 399; 402.) As the chairman
of the admissions committee stated: "The residual
category, and let me segregate-segregate is the
wrong word, but minorities were put aside for
separate consideration." (St. 344.) The most desirable
students were chosen within each of the two groups.
(St. 353; 420.) But the candidates in one group were
never considered in competition for the places allotted
to the other group. (St. 353; 399.) The number of
places allotted to minority applicants was changed
from year to year by as inconspicuous a decision as
possible. But a quota is no less a quota because it is
not labelled as such or because it is subject to annual
adjustment. (St. 416; 420.)
The use of the quota system-the segregation of two
groups of applicants by race with admission for each
group limited to its assigned numbers-makes it clear
that this is not simply a case where race was used as
one among many factors to determine admission.
Instead, the law school used race as the criterion for
imposing entirely separate admissions procedures.
The class that entered the University of Washington
Law School in 1971 was in fact two classes,
distinguished in terms of racial attributes, one of
"minority" students and the other of "majority"
students, recognized and chosen as such by the
University. To the extent that a place was assigned to
one group, it was inaccessible to a student from the
other group. What was demonstrated by the law
school here was not a form of integration of races but
rather a form of segregation of the races.
Never, since this Court struck down what Mr. Roy
Wilkins has called a "zero quota" (N. Y. Post, 3
March 1973) in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), has a racial quota been approved by
Philip 15. Kurland Alexander M. Bickel
this Court. Both proponents and opponents of inte-
gration have recognized such quotas as per se
violations of the Equal Protection Clause that cannot
be justified. That is why respondents try to assert that
what is involved here is not a "quota." For a quota is
not merely a racial classification. It is an attribution of
status-of caste-fixed by race. A quota necessarily
legislates not equality, but a governmental rule of
racial differences without regard to an individual's
attributes or merits.
This is made clear by the fact that the "minority"
applicants were not judged by different criteria for ad-
mission than were applied to the "majority"
candidates. The predictive factors for measuring
potential success in law school were the same for both
groups. What was different was the law school's ruling
that "minority" candidates, because of their race,
could not be expected to meet the higher standards
established for "majority" students, without any
regard to be given to individual capacities. Here lies
the inherent evil of quotas that reverse the objective of
Anglo-American democracies to move toward freedom
by the rejection of status, measured by immutable
factors like race, for assigning an individual his place
in our society.
I. Any Racial Classification by a State is Presump-
tively Invalid Under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
A generation ago, this Court held that the exclusion
of a black applicant from a state university law school
solely because of his race was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950). The Court is, nevertheless, asked here to hold
that the exclusion of a non-black applicant from the
law school of the State of Washington, solely because
of his race, is a valid racial classification. We respect-
fully submit that the rule of equality mandated by this
Court in Sweatt v. Painter compels the reversal of the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington in this
case.
It has long been established that a racial classifica-
tion imposed by "official state sources," Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967), is presumed to be in:
valid under the Equal Protection Clause.
(Please turn to page 21)
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to be not only reasonable but to satisfy the
"compelling interest" test.
Affirmance would establish the rule only where the
inequalities of opportunity are plain beyond dispute
and only in situations in which giving weight to
minority status does not increase the ratio of minority
students to all students significantly beyond the ratio
of minority groups to the whole population from
which the entering class is drawn. Nor does the case
require decision upon the constitutionality of fixing
specific racial, ethnic, linguistic or national quotas.
ARGUMENT
THE ADMISSIONS OFFICERS OF A STATE
UNIVERSITY MAY GIVE FAVORABLE WEIGHT
TO MEMBERSHIP IN A DISADVANTAGED
MINORITY GROUP AS A MEANS OF IMPROV-
ING THE EDUCATION OF ALL STUDENTS.
A. THE CONSCIOUS SELECTION OF SOME
QUALIFIED MEMBERS OF MINORITY
GROUPS FOR INCLUSION IN A STUDENT
BODY OF LIMITED SIZE IMPROVES THE
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES OF ALL
THE STUDENTS.
At an institution with many more applicants than
available places the admissions officers must be
prepared to answer two questions:
(1) How shall they determine which applicants are
"qualified" in the sense that they have sufficient
ability to benefit substantially from the proposed
course of study at the institution and to bring a
level of intellectual capacity to the classes which
does not impede other students? The question in
any given instance is, "will we accept this
applicant if there is room?"
(2) By what criteria shall they select from among a
large number of fully-qualified applicants the
much smaller number whom the institution can
accommodate?
We do not imply that in practice all applicants are
first put through the step of winnowing out the
unqualified, and that the qualified are thereafter
subjected to the step of selection. In practice, some
applicants will immediately appear to be qualified in
the first sense and to present an outstanding case for
selection in the second sense. In other instances,
especially where scholarly attainment is one of the
major criteria for selection, it may quickly appear that
although an applicant is "qualified" in the first sense,
his case for actual admission, in terms of the criteria
established for selection, is far too weak to merit
further consideration.
The distinction is important nonetheless, because
the criteria used for determining whether an applicant
is qualified must not be confused with the criteria for
actual selection. At the first stage the criteria are
chiefly intellectual: intelligence and aptitude tests,
past academic record and previous education. Health
and motivation may be minor elements. Membership
in a racial or disadvantaged minority group is
relevant, if at all, only in adjusting test scores and
other predictors of academic success in order to
compensate for correctable deficiencies in the
previous experience or education of particular
students. A priori the qualities which admissions
officers at a particular institution value in making
actual selections may be the same as those to which
they look in determining admissibility, but they may
be different or they may be overlapping. The various
predictors of academic success measured by grades on
examinations and assigned papers may be the best
measure in judging whether an applicant possesses
the school's minimum qualifications, but neither logic
nor law nor sound educational policy commands
exclusive use of, or even any reliance upon, the
predictors in making selections from among the
qualified applicants at the second stage of admissions.
Most institutions treat sufficiently great promise of
academic success as ground for actual admission,
using virtually the same predictors as are used in
determining minimum qualification, but below that
level such predictions may be treated as irrelevant, or
the greater academic promise of one applicant may be
judged less important than some quite different asset
of another. The proportion of students selected
because of academic promise alone differs from
institution to institution. Harvard College selects
about 150 students on the basis of extraordinary
intellectual potential for an entering class of 1,100.
The failure to grasp this essential distinction is the
source of petitioners' repeated but misleading
(Please turn to page 58)
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Wle deal here with a classification based upon the
race of the participants, which must be viewed in
light of the historical fact that the central purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate
racial discrimination emanating from official
sources in the States. This strong policy renders
racial classification "constitutionally suspect,"
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499; and subject
to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216; and "in most circum-
stances irrelevant" to any constitutionally accept-
able legislative purpose. Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100. (McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 191, 192 (1964).)
Racial discrimination is not justified because the
burden of the state action falls on both races or all
races so classified. "Equal protection of the laws is not
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of in-
equalities." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
There is no question here but that DeFunis's
exclusion from the state law school was a result of a
racial classification. The trial court ordered DeFunis's
admission for that reason. Nor did the Supreme Court
of Washington disagree with the lower court that the
law school had used a racial classification to exclude
DeFunis. Rather, it announced that, in ostensible
conformity with the commands of this Court, "the
burden is upon the law school to show that its consid-
eration of race in admitting students is necessary to
the accomplishment of a compelling state interest."
(507 P. 2d at 1182.)
In short, the controversy in this Court is not over the
question whether a racial classification was used as
the basis for the exclusion of DeFunis, but whether
that otherwise unconstitutional racial classification
was validated by "a compelling state interest."
It is our position that a racial classification that
takes the form of a racial quota, as in this case, is un-
constitutional vel non, because racial quotas are
anathema to the concept of individual freedom. But
we submit that even if a racial quota does not fall into
a special invalid category of its own giving rise to an
irrebuttable presumption of violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the racial classification here
cannot be validly imposed within the limits of the
Equal Protection Clause.
II. A Racial Classification by a State Is Invalid Under
the Equal Protection Clause Except as a Specific
_____DICKEL G KURLAIID
Remedy for Specific Unconstitutional or Illegal
Racial Discrimination.
Not since Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), has this Court permitted the use of race as a
factor for classification, except to cure an earlier
illegally imposed racial discrimination. And even in
those cases in which this Court has sanctioned such
limited cognizance of a racial factor, the use of the
racial factor has been condoned only to assure the
elimination of the illegal discrimination and never as a
tool for "reverse discrimination" of the kind sought to
be justified by the Washington Supreme Court here.
Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31
(1971).
The Washington Supreme Court rested heavily on a
dictum of this Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burgBoard ofEducation, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971), which
affords no support for the conclusion reached by the
state court. At most, Swann, in its context of remedial
litigation, suggested that a school system might
provide for the distribution of students already in the
system in the relative proportions of the races in the
school system as a whole.
Indeed, the Washington Supreme Court recognized
that the use of "race" in Swann was justified only "to
prevent the perpetuation of discrimination and to
undo the effects of past segregation." (507 P. 2d at
1180.) But it failed to recognize that there was no
showing on the record in this case of any past discrim-
ination by respondents that purported to be remedied
by the law school's use of a racial quota. Nor did it
seem to understand that Swann did not endorse a
"fixed racial balance or quota" even in the presence of
a clear demonstration of prior discrimination.
Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education
v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1227 (1971).
It is equally important to see that in Swann, and
other cases dealing with segregation in public schools,
the contemplated remedy-a remedy for specific
racial discrimination-is a reassignment of students
within the system. The "racial balances" involved in
those cases denied no white or black, Indian or
Asiatic, education at a state school. Here, however,
the law school's admission process flatly denied access
of white students, including DeFunis, to state
education facilities in order to make them available to
others of different race, because of their race.
(Please turn to page 60)
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As we confront the new demands on government
and its administrative apparatus that the energy
crisis, the environmental crisis, and the population
crisis pose and reflect on the ethical product of our
existing institutions of governance, Dean Manning's
questions take on a sharper pertinence. However, it is
not enough to compare the utility of his two
competing targets for social investment. One must
also ask how effectively legal education is now
structured to contribute to the improved functioning
of government, its greater efficiency, and a higher
ethical product. As we now stand, an appeal for funds
based on such a representation would, I suggest, invite
skepticism. However, the prospect of satisfying the
skeptical legislator or donor would, I believe, rise
dramatically if the funding's proposed objective were
not simply a better-financed law school
but a fully-developed law center. L
Reprinted with permission from The University of Tennes-
see Law Review.
Cox~
(Continued from page 20)
assertion that minority applicants were preferred
despite DeFunis, Jr.'s superior qualifications. Peti-
tioners' Opening Brief, pp. 2,7. The assertion assumes
that the predictors used in measuring admissibility
are the only proper criteria in the process of selection.
The assumption is contrary to policy and practice
both at the University of Washington Law School and
elsewhere.
At the stage of selection, the educational and
admissions policies of any institution of higher
learning should be interrelated. The criteria of
selection determine the composition of the student
body, which in turn seriously affects the kind and
quality of educational opportunities offered to all
students. Policies fixing the criteria should therefore
be based upon academic decisions concerning the
kinds and quality of educational opportunities the
institution wishes to offer.
A given institution might wish simply to select
students of the highest intellectual capacity, measured
by scholastic records and potential, in the belief that it
should be exclusively concerned with challenging the
intellect and increasing the formal learning of the
student body, and with encouraging the students thus
to challenge each other in these areas. Exclusive
reliance on measured achievement might also be
thought to introduce the highest form of equality and
productive stimulus.
Another institution might conclude that education
should be conceived more broadly and that, given
minimum assurance of scholastic competence, all
students are best served by selecting from the
qualified applicants the entering class whose members
have the most diverse social, economic and cultural
backgrounds and the widest variety of talents and
interests. In this view, diversity is a stimulus to the
development of every student's personality and under-
standing as well as a preparation for the society in
which he will live. Securing these non-discriminatory,
educational objectives for the whole student body
dictates evaluating a wide variety of personal
characteristics, many of them utterly irrelevant in
measuring ability to meet academic standards.
Still a third institution might wish to give
substantial weight-say 40 percent-to superior
intellectual qualifications in filling all the places in a
class, but conclude that an equally marked superiority
in other qualities judged to be important should be
enough to offset them.
In the first case, neither race nor minority status
would be relevant. In the second and third cases,
membership in a minority race or other special ethnic
group would be a relevant and often highly material
consideration because of its significance in forming an
entering class whose members will have the diverse
characteristics, attachments and experience making
them markedly stimulating to each other. Race, color
or ethnic origin, like economic or cultural back-
ground, is one of the many characteristics that a
student presents to his classmates as an individual
does to the world-a characteristic which should carry
neither invidious distinction nor arbitrary preference,
which some treat as always and utterly irrelevant but
which others may perceive as encouraging pride and a
sense of identification in cultural origins and diversity
without hostile connotation. Race, color and ethnic
origin also tend to identify forms of special
experience, social and cultural background, outlook,
interests and attachments which make important
contributions to a student body. This is especially true
at any institution which has been predominantly white
for a long period.
The foregoing general observations concerning the
relationship between educational and admissions
policy are drawn largely from experience at a number
of Harvard schools, especially the undergraduate
college. For the past 25 years Harvard College has
received each year applications for admission that
greatly exceed the number of places in the freshman
class. The number of applicants who are deemed to be
not "qualified" is comparatively small. The vast
majority of applicants demonstrate through test
scores, high school records and teachers' recom-
mendations that they have the academic ability to do
adequate work at Harvard, and perhaps to do it with
distinction. Faced with the dilemma of choosing
among a large number of "qualified" candidates, the
Committee on Admissions could use the single
criterion of scholarly excellence and attempt to
determine who among the candidates were likely to
perform best academically. But for the past 25 years
the Committee on Admissions has never adopted this
approach. The belief has been that if scholarly
excellence were the sole or even predominant
criterion, Harvard College would lose a great deal of
FIFTY-EIGRT
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its vitality and intellectual excellence and that the
quality of the educational experience offered to all
students would suffer. Final Report of W. J. Bender,
Chairman of the Admission and Scholarship
Committee and Dean of Admissions and Financial
Aid, pp. 20 et seq. (Cambridge, 1960). Consequently,
after selecting those students whose intellectual
potential will seen- extraordinary to the faculty-per-
haps 150 or so out of an entering class of over
1,100-the Committee seeks:
variety in making its choices. This has seemed
important ... in part because it adds a critical
ingredient to the effectiveness of the educational
experience [ in Harvard College] . . . The effect-
tiveness of our students' educational experience
has seemed to the Committee to be affected as
importantly by a wide variety of interests, talents,
backgrounds and career goals as it is by a fine
faculty and our libraries, laboratories and housing
arrangements. (Dean of Admissions Fred L.
Glimp, Final Report to the Faculty of Arts and
Sciences, 65 Official Register of Harvard
University No. 25, 93, 104-105 (1968). (emphasis
supplied)
The belief that diversity adds an essential ingredient
to the educational process has long been a tenet of
Harvard College admissions. Ten or fifteen or twenty
years ago, however, diversity meant students from
California, New York and Massachusetts; city
dwellers and farm boys; violinists, painters and
football players; biologists, historians and classicists;
potential stockbrokers, academics and politicians.
The result was that very few ethnic or racial minorities
attended Harvard College. In recent years Harvard
College has expanded the concept of diversity to
include students from disadvantaged economic, racial
and ethnic groups. Harvard College now recruits not
only Californians or Louisianans but also blacks and
chicanos and other minority students. Contemporary
conditions in the United States mean that if Harvard
College is to continue to offer a first-rate education to
its students, minority representation in the under-
graduate body cannot be ignored by the Committee on
Admissions.
In practice, this new definition of diversity has
meant that race has been a factor in some admission
decisions. When the Committee on Admissions
reviews the large middle group of applicants who are
"admissible" and deemed capable of doing good work
in their courses, the race of an applicant may tip the
balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life
spent on a farm may tip the balance in other
candidates' cases. A farm boy from Idaho can bring
something to Harvard College that a Bostonian
cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually
bring something that a white person cannot offer. The
quality of the educational experience of all the
students in Harvard College depends in part on these
differences in the background and outlook that
students bring with them.
In Harvard College admissions the Committee has
not set target-quotas for the number of blacks, or of
musicians, football players, physicists or Californians
to be admitted in a given year. At the same time the
Committee is aware that if Harvard College is to pro-
vide a truly heterogeneous environment that reflects
the rich diversity of the United States, it cannot be
provided without some attention to numbers. It would
not make sense, for example, to have 10 or 20
students out of 1,100 whose homes are west of the
Mississippi. Comparably, 10 or 20 black students/
could not begin to bring to their classmates and to
each other the variety of points of view, backgrounds
and experiences of blacks in the United States. Their
small number might also create a sense of isolation
among the black students themselves and thus make
it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their
potential. Consequently, when making its decisions,
the Committee on Admissions is aware that there is
some relationship between numbers and achieving the
benefits to be derived from a diverse student body,
and between numbers and providing a reasonable
environment for those students admitted. But that
awareness does not mean that the Committee sets a
minimum number of blacks or of people from west of
the Mississippi who are to be admitted. It means only
that in choosing among thousands of applicants who
are not only "admissible" academically but have other
strong qualities, the Committee, with a number of
criteria in mind, pays some attention to distribution
among many types and categories of students.
The further refinements sometimes required help to
illustrate the kind of significance attached to race.
The Admissions Committee, with only a few places
left to fill, might find itself forced to choose between
A, the child of a successful black" physician in an
academic community with promise of superior
academic performance, and B, a black who grew up
in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents whose
academic achievement was lower but who had
demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an
apparently-abiding interest in black power. If a good
number of black students much like A but few like B
had already been admitted, the Committee might
prefer B; and vice versa. If C, a white student with
extraordinary artistic talent, were also seeking one of
the remaining places, his unique quality might give
him an edge over both A and B. Thus, the critical
criteria are often individual qualities or experience not
dependent upon race but sometimes associated with
it.
The explicit emphasis put on diversity at Harvard
College is greater than in other parts of Harvard
University. The range of relevant diversity is probably
greater in undergraduate than graduate education;
musical talent, for example, would surely be given
greater weight by the Admissions Committee of
Harvard College than by the committees at the
Medical School or Law School. The level of
intellectual promise, coupled with academic prepara-
tion, is so uniformly superior among a large number
of applicants and refined differences have such
relatively small importance for undergraduate
education as to furnish scant basis for selection.
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Emphasizing a wide range of diversity, moreover,
almost automatically ensures that Harvard College
will help to open educational and career opportunities
to young men-and through Radcliffe College, young
women-from all parts of society and sections of the
country.
Though the range of significant diversities may be
less at some graduate or professional schools and
relatively less weight may be placed upon them, all
Harvard faculties recognize the educational impor-
tance of diversity of social and economic background,
experience and resulting outlook in the class and
seminar rooms, and in less formal discussions in the
dormitories and commons. The point was well stated
in the brief filed by The Committee of Law Teachers
Against Segregation in Legal Education in Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), as printed at 34 MINN.
L. REV. 289, 325 (1950):
The lawyer, to meet the responsibilities of his
profession, must have a vital sense of the culture
of the community in which he lives and works.
"Lawyers are perpetually engaged in trying to
anticipate, prevent, mediate, settle or win human
disagreements involving alleged rights recognized
at law. Their thinking, planning and action are
framed and limited by what they understand to be
the prevailing principles and doctrines of
law . . ." The knowledge required for these tasks
can in part be obtained from books; but a major
share must come from intimate knowledge of the
ways of thought of the community. "He (the
lawyer) is literally lost unless he can sense the
drives, interests (and weaknesses) of those with
whom he deals-whether as witnesses, negotia-
tors, judges, clients, or opponents." (footnotes
omitted)
In sum, diversity within the student body is often an
intermediate goal of educational policy because
diversity surely may-and most experienced educators
believe that it does-improve the education of all
students. A hard-and-fast rule forbidding an institu-
tion to give favorable consideration to membership in
a minority race or other minority group in selecting an
entering class from the qualified applicants would
severely constrict the freedom of academic authorities
to improve the non-discriminatory educational *3
opportunities for the whole student body.
Archibald Cox
is Professor of Law, Harvard University.
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Each of the cases cited by the Washington Supreme
Court to justify the racial discrimination indulged by
the law school here, e.g., Swann, supra; Porcelli v.
Titus, 431 F. 2d 1254 (3rd Cir., 1970); Carter v.
Gallagher, 452 R. 2d 315 (8th Cir., 1971), tolerates the
use of a racial standard by the state, but only to cure
racial discrimination imposed by the party against
whom the remedy is ordered. In this case, however,
there is nothing in the record on which to base a
finding of unequal treatment by race in the
University of Washington, or, indeed, in the State of
Washington.
Generalized historical assertion about conditions
somewhere in the United States some time in the past
is not the premise of the remedial discrimination cases
decided by this Court, nor should it be. If such a
predicate were allowed to replace careful, specific
findings of discrimination as the necessary condition
for sustaining reverse discrimination, such state racial
preferences would be constitutionally sanctioned in a
wide range of circumstances that would denigrate if
not destroy the concept of racial equality specified in
the Equal Protection Clause. Nor, in the light of our
history, see, e.g., G. MYERS, A HISTORY OF BIGOTRY
IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1960), would such
"benevolence" be limited to those few "minorities"
singled out by the State of Washington here. "The
clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources
of invidious racial discrimination in the States."
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
We submit that the use of race as a standard for the
elimination of specific prior racial discrimination
permits only the elimination of specific prior racial
discrimination and not a substitution of racial
discrimination against others.
IM. The Benign Intent of the Framers of the Racial
Quota Here Cannot Save It. The Validity of
State Racial Discrimination Is Measured by
Effect Not Motive.
It is argued that the racial quotas adopted by the
law school here are not "invidious" because their
purpose was "benign." But respondents' purpose in
effecting its racial quota system is irrevelant. It is not
the purpose but the effect of a racial classification that
commands its invalidation. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401, U.S. 424, 432 (1971). This is a lesson that
this Court has continuously declared. For example, in
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,
462 (1972), the Court answered, "Thus, we have
focused upon the effect-not the purpose or
motivation-of a school board's action in determining
whether it is a permissible method of dismantling a
dual system. The existence of a permissible purpose
cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible
effect." And in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961), the Court said:
"[N]o State may effectively abdicate its responsibili-
ties by either ignoring them or by merely failing to
discharge them whatever the motive may be. It is of no
consolation to an individual denied the equal
protection of the laws that it was done in good faith."
The Supreme Court of Washington conceded that
"the minority admissions policy is certainly not
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benign with respect to nonminority students who are
displaced by it." (507 P. 2d at 1182.) Since it is the
"nonminority student" who is the victim of this
invalid racial classification, that should suffice to
dispose of the argument of the benign nature of the
racial classification. But there is even reason to doubt
the State court's notion that the evil of a racial quota
does not stigmatize the "minority student" who gains
admissions under such circumstances. For there is
certainly the great possibility of that consequence,
especially where, as under the law school's admissions
program, the lower admission standards for "minority
students" were such a well-publicized element. (St.
418, Exh. 45.) A recent black graduate of a law school
put the problem cogently:
Traditionally, first-year law students are supposed
to be afraid, or at least awed; but our fear was
compounded by the uncommunicated realization
that perhaps we were not authentic law students
and the uneasy suspicion that our classmates knew
that we were not, and like certain members of the
faculty, had developed paternalistic attitudes
toward us. (McPherson, The Black Law Student:
A Problem of Fidelities, ATLANTIC 88 (April
1970).)
The quota system is admittedly not "benign" so far as
the excluded majority applicants are concerned.
There is little or no basis for suggesting that it is not
"invidious" and "stigmatizing" for the category of
applicant labelled by race as incapable of meeting the
standards applied to others. See Graglia, Special
Admission of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law
School, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 351, 353-59 (1970).
Indeed, a racial quota is always stigmatizing and
invidious, particularly when it is applied to areas
concerned with intellectual competency and capacity.
It is suggested that such a statement lacks sincerity if
made by a non-black. And so we have attached as an
Appendix to this brief a copy of a nationally
syndicated interview with Dr. Kenneth Clark, no
stranger to this Court's decisions, which confirms the
position advanced by us here. This is so essentially for
the reasons stated by Professor Thomas Sowell in his
book Black Education, Myths and Tragedies 292
(1972):
[T]he actual harm done by quotas is far greater
than having a few incompetent people here and
there-and the harm that will actually be done
will be harm primarily to the black population.
What all the arguments and campaigns for quotas
are really saying, loud and clear, is that black
people just don't have it, and that they will have to
be given something in order to have something.
The devastating impact of this message on black
people-particularly black young people-will
outweigh any few extra jobs that may result from
this strategy. Those black people who are already
competent, and who could be instrumental in
producing more competence among this rising
generation, will be completely undermined, as
black becomes synonymous-in the minds of
black and white alike-with incompetence, and
black achievement becomes synonymous with
charity or payoffs.
A racial quota is derogatory to those it is intended to
benefit and depriving of those from whom is taken
what is "given" to the minority. A beneficent quota is
invidious as it is patronizing.
IV. There Are No "Compelling State Interests" to
Justify the Racial Quotas Used by the
Respondents to Determine Admission to the
State's Law School.
The Washington Supreme Court announced that
the law school's racial policies were on their face
presumptively invalid but might be justified on a
showing of a "compelling state interest." It then
examined the evidence and proceeded to validate the
racial quotas on what, at most, could be called a
"rational means" test.
As we have already argued, there can be no
"compelling state interest" for racial classification by
the state except for its use to eliminate, adverse racial
classification theretofore imposed, or perhaps where
the nation's security in time of war may be thought to
justify such classification. See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Assuming, however, that
racial quotas can be justified by some other
"compelling state interest," there is no such interest
justified in this record.
The record in this case is devoid of support for the
conclusion of "compelling state interest." Indeed,
there was no conscious effort by respondents at trial to
demonstrate any compelling state interest. Respon-
dents' case rested primarily on "the cultural
disadvantage" which the admissions committee
wished to take into account in awarding places in the
class. It was assumed, but not shown, that cultural
disadvantage could be correlated with the four
minority groups whose members Were to be given
preferential treatment. (St. 416; 73-74; 90; 108; 353;
400-01; 418-19; 424-25.) As one witness on
compensatory pre-law training put it: "In formal
terms, we articulate our concern for the economically
and culturally disadvantaged. I suppose in practical
terms our efforts have been largely with the minority
group student . . ." (St. 125.) The equation between
the "minority group students" and the culturally
deprived can no more be made to justify racial
classification than can the equation between minority
groups and the economically deprived in the political
sphere. Compare Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967), with James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
When asked to explain the law school's race-based
preferential treatment, respondents repeatedly
claimed to be favoring applicants from deprived
cultural and educational backgrounds. Those who
offered this justification included the chairman of the
school's admissions committee (St. 352; 402), the dean
of the law school (St. 416-18; 424-25), the president of
the university (St. 225; 243-44), and the former
chairman of the board of trustees of the university (St.
SIXTY- ONE
HeinOnline  -- 1 Learning & L. 25 1974
108, 111). The evidence is, however, clear that
defendants did not give preferential treatment to
"deprived students" who were not blacks, Chicanos,
Indians, or Philippinos. (See, e.g., St. 344; 352; 399.)
There is nothing in this record that shows that
membership in one of the four minority races
correlates with such deprivation. Indeed, a member of
one of the favored minorities was to be treated as
"culturally deprived" so far as the law school was
concerned, even if he came from a highly intellectual
and cultured family. Moreover, if a correlation could
be made that showed every member of the four racial
minorities to fall into the category of culturally and
educationally deprived, the classification would still
be invalid for underinclusiveness because it would fail
to include culturally and economically deprived
persons who are not members of these four racial
minorities.
What the Constitution prohibits is that admissions
be determined by race. Equal protection might not be
offended by consideration of cultural deprivation; it is
offended by considerations of race. If elimination of
cultural deprivation were the compelling principle,
however, it was not the guide used for special
treatment for admissions to the law school here. The
rule established for the University of Washington
School of Law was simply that it was easier for a
black, a Chicano, an American Indian, or a
Philippino to enter than for a white or an Asian,
without regard to the cultural deprivation from which
the applicant may or may not have suffered. (St.
108-09; 225; 243-44; 261; 418; 423-24; 431.)
To support the so-called state interest in
discrimination on the basis of race the Supreme Court
of Washington relied only on three bits of evidence: (1)
a self-serving declaration by the dean of the law school
(St. 416); (2) the text of an impromptu speech given by
the president of the university to a group of striking
black students in 1968 during the time of the
"university troubles" (Exh. 13); and (3) a "Survey of
Black Law Student Enrollment" giving statistics for
125 law schools including the University of
Washington School of Law for the year 1970-71 (Exh.
7). These three items are patently inadequate to carry
the "heavy burden" of showing a compelling state
interest of the State of Washington in discriminating
in favor of four racial groups in filling its law school
classes.
In this case the State, thus, made only a token effort
to shoulder the heavy burden of proving a compelling
state interest in racial discrimination. Even if the
minimal proof accepted by the Supreme Court of
Washington could qualify under a rational means
test, it cannot meet the compelling state interest test.
The substitution of the lower quantum of proof is
explicitly forbidden by a consistent line of cases in this
Court dealing with racial classifications. Slaughter-
house Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71 (1870);Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1880); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967);Hunterv. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
That the compelling state interest necessary to
justify a racial quota has not been established here
may be quickly seen from a glance at the decisions of
this Court in recent years that have applied that
standard. Although none of them involved so patent a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause as a racial
quota, in each case this Court has ruled that the
interest of the state was not sufficient to override the
prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Harper v.
State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Kraemer v.
Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Indeed, as
the Chief Justice pointed out in his dissent in Dunn v.
Blumstein, "[No] state law has ever satisfied this
seemingly insurmountable standard." (405 U.S. 330,
363-64 (1972).)
The "compelling interest" standard has another
attribute that was substantially ignored by the
Washington Supreme Court and that dictates the
reversal of that court's judgment. This Court stated in
Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. at 343: "Rif there
are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with
a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity,
a State may not choose the way of greater interference.
If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic means'."
There was in this case no substantial undertaking to
discover the feasibility of means other than the
utilization of a presumptively invalid racial quota for
admission to the law school to accomplish the alleged
state interests asserted here.
Obviously, as the compelling state interest cases
already cited reveal, this Court is not the place to
examine the alternatives that might permit the State
to bring more of the culturally deprived members of
racial minorities into the law school on an equal
footing with other students. Affirmative action
programs, not quotas are the requirements of national
policy. (See our brief in support of the petition for
certiorari in this case at pp. 19 et seq.) An "open
admission" policy without racial standards might
afford the answer. It might also be possible to open
more places in law schools at the University of
Washington or in other State university facilities
where admission would not depend on the racial
characteristics of the applicants. Special schooling
might be afforded for preparation for admission to
law schools for those who cannot meet the existent
standards without such additional training, but again
only so long as that schooling is not afforded on a
racial basis. This case, however, involves no legitimate
affirmative action, but a racial quota. As our brief in
support of the petition for certiorari pointed out,
so-called affirmative action programs that are not
circumscribed in terms consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause collapse into the very evil they seek
to cure.
The social problem that the Washington Supreme
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Court purported to address cannot properly be
considered one of quantity rather than quality. Even if
it were legitimate to postulate, as that court did, that a
lawyer or doctor should be trained to serve only
persons of the same skin color or parental origins-a
proposition that itself is inconsistent with the doctrine
of equality underlying the Fourteenth Amendment-
those doctors and lawyers should have the same
appropriate skills and capacities as those practising
their professions on behalf of others. The answer to
the problem cannot be, as the Washington court
would have it, a simple play on numbers. This we
think should be evident from the fact that the alleged
compelling state interest asserted by the Washington
court here-providing training for black lawyers to
serve black clients-would most easily and readily be
met by creation of additional separate law schools for
"minority" applicants who do not meet the standards
for admission to existent law schools. No one doubts
that the patent invalidity of such racial classification
could not be overcome by the "compelling state
interest" asserted here. Neither can the racial device
actually used by the law school be justified by the
"compelling state interest" found by the Washington
Supreme Court.
The most charitable reading of the Washington
Supreme Court's decision is that it has said that the
alternative means for reaching its goal are more
difficult, more time-consuming, more expensive. So
long as the alternatives have the virtue of
constitutionality, however, the Equal Protection
Clause commands their use rather than the
unconstitutional means that may be quicker, or less
difficult, or less expensive. If the goals attributed to
the state here are constitutionally valid, they cannot
be accomplished by the unconstitutional means of
that most invidious of discriminatory devices, the
racial quota.
CONCLUSION
The judgment below should be reversed because it
condones the use of a patently unconstitutional means
to an invalid end. A racial quota creates a status on
the basis of factors that have to be irrelevant to any
objectives of a democratic society, the factors of skin
color or parental origin. A racial quota derogates the
human dignity and individuality of all to whom it is
applied. A racial quota is invidious in principle as well
as in practice. Though it may be thought here to help
"minority" students, it can as easily be turned against
those same or other minorities. The history of the
racial quota is a history of subjugation not
beneficence.
The evil of the racial quota lies not in its name but in
its effect. A quota by any other name is still a divider
of society, a creator of castes, and it is all the worse for
its racial base, especially in a society desperately
striving for an equality that will make race irrel- **
evant, politically, economically, and socially. LL
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prejudicial to my case than any reasoning I might do
with geometry to show that Raines had time to slow
down or that Milford speeded up. I think it would
have been damaging.
HELMQUIST: Sir, I think I would have to agree with
Mr. Schweitzer. I think he had a lot more to gain than
to lose if he could establish that the defendant was
travelling at an excessive rate of speed, based on the
conditions of the road. Even if the defense counsel
established that the witness was also travelling at an
excessive rate of speed, this does not negate the fact
that defendant was also travelling at an excessive rate
of speed. I think the passing testimony would raise a
presumption in the jury's mind of negligence. We
don't know when Milford left Green River because he
never said what time he left Green River. Therefore,
this idea of it only taking an hour is strictly theoretical
because it is based on Raines's estimate that it only
took an hour. Also, we don't know exactly when the
accident occurred as to the time Milford arrived on
the scene. He said it could have just happened or it
might have just happened. If any impeachment were
done on this point, I think I could have rehabilitated
Mr. Milford.
WALKER: There is nothing theoretical at all about
the time that it took him to travel this 27 miles
because he stated he was going approximately 25
miles per hour. Even though he didn't say what time
he left Green River, the fact is that if you travel at 25
miles per hour it would take you approximately one
hour.
KEETON: Mr. Walker, I think, if I may interrupt,
that it might help us if you asked a few questions of
the witness as you would have undertaken to do if this
matter of speed had come in, that is, if you had not
objected when you did, and successfully, to this
testimony about speed. You have indicated that you
would have wanted to make something of this on your
cross examination. Mr. Evans, in his role as Mr.
Milford, is sitting right beside you now. I would like
you to go ahead and ask the questions you would put
on cross examination.
WALKER: Yes, sir. Now, Mr. Milford, you have
already testified that the defendant's car passed you
for the second time three miles outside of Green
River.
MILFORD: Yes, sir, it was three miles west of Green
River.
WALKER: And I believe you also indicated that it
was about 27 miles from this point to the point where
the accident took place?
MILFORD: Yes, sir, I did.
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